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The lien, although unqualified and broad, requires all persons dealing with
such estates to investigate at their peril the condition of the estate with
respect to federal estate taxes.22 Notice of the federal estate tax lien need
not be recorded 23 or filed as required under the general tax lien statute2'
in order for said lien to prevail against subsequent mortgages, judgments
and other general tax liens.
The history and the differences between the provisions already noted
would compel one to conclude that the two statutes, one providing a general
lien and the other providing a specific lien for estate taxes, are distinct and
separate, and tend to operate independently. It appears from the analogy
thus drawn, the Supreme Court has wisely adopted the theory that the
legislature had both statutes in mind when it enacted the latter, and thus
intended the federal estate tax lien to work independently of the other.
S. F. W.
TORTS-PRoxIMATE CAUs--REscun D0cTRIN--[Federal].-At 6 A. M.
on a foggy morning, defendant collided with the rear end of a truck
driven by one Elias and caused the truck to become stalled on the highway.
Shortly thereafter, plaintiff, a driver of a tow-truck, passing the scene,
offered to pull the Elias truck off the highway because of its danger to
other motorists. While plaintiff was connecting a tow-line, a fourth car
collided with the rear end of the Elias truck and crushed the plaintiff
between the two trucks. Plaintiff brought an action against the defendant,
the original wrongdoer, who contended that his negligence in colliding
22. Under §411 of the Internal Revenue Act of 1942 amending Internal
Revenue Code §827(b) it is provided, "If the tax herein imposed is not
paid when due, then the spouse, transferee, trustee, surviving tenant,
* * * * * * * *, who receives, or has on the date of the decedent's death,
property included in the gross estate under section 811(e), to the extent
of the value, at the time of the decedent's death, of such property, shall
be personally liable for such tax. Any part of such property sold by such
spouse, transferee, trustee, surviving tenant, * * * * * * * *, to a bona
fide purchaser for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth shall be divested of the lien provided in section 827(a) and a like
lien shall then attach to all the property of such spouse, transferee, trustee,
surviving tenant, * * * * * * ** * * * *, except any part sold to a bona
fide purchaser for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth." This amended provision tends to remedy the problem in part by
making the surviving tenant personally liable for any unpaid estate tax
on property received at or after the death of the decedent. In the case of
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Helvering (App. D. C. 1942) 128 F.(2d) 745, where insurance passed under a contract in favor of special bene-
ficiary, the court held that an insurance company, holding proceeds of life
policies after decedent's death, is not a "transferee" within the meaning
of the statute but such beneficiary is the only person personally liable for
the tax.
23. United States v. National Surety Co. (U. S. 1920) 254 U. S. 73;
Spokane County v. United States (U. S. 1929) 279 U. S. 80; United States
v. San Juan County (D. C. W. D. Wash. 1922) 280 Fed. 120; United
States v. McGuire (D. C. D. N. J. 1941) 42 F. Supp. 337.
24. (1866) 14 Stat. 107, as amended (1928) 45 Stat. 875, c. 852 §613,
26 U. S. C. A. §§3670-3677.
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with the Elias truck was not the "proximate cause" of the plaintiff's in-
juries because of the intervening act of the fourth driver. From a judg-
ment for the plaintiff, defendant appeals. Held: Affirmed. Under the
"rescue doctrine" the chain of causation was not broken by an intervening
act, since it was a normal reaction for plaintiff to go to another's as-
sistance in an emergency. Since the defendant brought about the inter-
vening cause by his original wrongful act, he should have foreseen these
consequences might occur as a result of his negligent act. Rovinski v.
Rowe.'
In the early cases the tendency was to be satisfied with the result that
the only actionable cause was the cause which actually did the injury2
and to give little if any legal significance to the original cause which made
it possible for the intervening cause to be set in operation. Today, be-
cause of the number of automobile accidents arising out of negligent driv-
ing, the courts have found it necessary to extend the liability of wrongful
actors beyond the confines of former rules which, while more nearly ac-
ceptable at the time of their inception, are definitely too narrow for modern
law.3 The majority of the modern courts hold that if the intervening act
might reasonably have been foreseen or anticipated as the natural or
probable result of the original negligence, the original negligence will be
regarded as the proximate cause of the injury.4 The original wrongdoer
is not required to foresee the injury in the exact form in which it results,
or to anticipate the precise results which flow from his original negligent
act or omission of duty.5
The operator of an automobile must exercise reasonable care in driving
on the highway and must take into consideration conditions of fog, mist,
and darkness. 6 And should an accident occur by reason of the fact that
the driver's view is impaired by mist or fog or darkness, as in the prin-
cipal case, the defendant cannot escape liability by showing that the injury
resulted because of the negligence of a third person in contributing to the
results, and that the accident and injury would not have happened "but
for" the third person's negligence.7 The defendant's negligence in the
driving of his automobile started a chain of events creating a dangerous
and existing condition, and the injury resulting therefrom was the proxi-
mate consequence of the defendant's act.8
Policy and fairness demand that the loss should fall on the wrongdoer,
1. (C. C. A. 6, 1942) 131 F. (2d) 687.
2. Coy v. Dean (1928) 222 Mo. App. 67, 4 S. W. (2d) 835.
3. Szabo v. Tabor Ice Cream Co. (1930) 37 Ohio App. 42, 174 N. E. 18.
4. Daneschocky v. Sieble (1917) 195 Mo. App. 470, 193 S. W. 966.
5. Ft. Wayne Drug Co. v. Flemion (1931) 93 Ind. App. 40, 175 N. E.
$70.
6. Reed v. Ogden & Moffett (1930) 252 Mich. 362, 233 N. W. 345.
7. 8 Blashfield, Cyc. of Automobile Law (1935) §§2551, 2552.
8. Upton v. Town of Windham (1902) 75 Conn. 288, 53 AtI. 660, 96
Am. St. Rep. 197; Holmberg v. Villaume (1924) 158 Minn. 442, 197 N. W.
849; Campbell v. City of Stillwater (1884) 32 Minn. 308, 20 N. W. 320, 50
Am. Rep. 567; Dugan v. St. Paul & D. R. Co. (1889) 40 Minn. 544, 42
N. W. 588. Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act (1920) 33 Harv.
L. Rev. 683, 650.
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rather than on the injured person. 9 This holding is commensurate with the
doctrine that the intrusion of an intervening agency does not always excuse
the original wrongdoer.'O In order to excuse the defendant the intervening
cause must produce the injury alone without the negligence of the defendant
contributing to the result in the slightest degree.11 In the principal case,
the two events were not disconnected independent incidents, for the stage
was set, so to speak, when defendant's negligent act came to rest in a
dangerous and active condition. The intervening act of negligence follow-
ing the defendant's negligent act in a natural and ordinary sequence, was
foreseeable 12 by the defendant so that he is not relieved from liability be-
cause of the intervening negligence of another.13
On a- foggy night the defendant could not without being guilty of neg-
ligence proceed blindly along the highway with confidence that he was the
only motorist, but as a reasonable man, he should have anticipated that
others might be using the highway irrespective of the weather. The de-
fendant should have known from ordinary experience that he was under a
duty to take all necessary precautions to protect other motorists and guard
against any possible collisions. The time which elapsed between the oc-
currence of the two collisions was of little or no importance because the
appearance of the fourth automobile upon the scene was foreseeable and
the chain of causation remained unbroken so long as the highway con-
tinued to be blocked. Although the defendant could not have foreseen the
coming of the plaintiff in the role of a rescuer, he is as responsible as
if he had, for danger invites rescue.' 4 Under the circumstances plaintiff's
actions were reasonable and arose from the situation created by the neg-
ligence of defendant. It is submitted that if the accident had occurred on
a clear day, the decisions of the court would have been contra to the hold-
ing in the principal case. It would then have been possible for the driver
of the fourth automobile to become aware of the danger and be in a
position to deal with 'it, while the defendant would have been free to
assume that he would act reasonably. M. H. F.
9. Carpenter, Workable Rules For Determining Proximate Cause (1932)
20 Calif. L. Rev. 471.
10.. Early v. Burt (1932) 134 Kan. 445, 7 P. (2d) 95 (aff'd) 135 Kan.
717, 12 P. (2d) 1117; Fergus Lane v. Atlantic Works (1872) 111 Mass. 136.
11. State of Maryland v. Hecht Co. (1933) 165 Md. 415, 169 Atl. 311.
12. Morrison v. Medaglia (1934) 287 Mass. 46, 191 N. E. 133. Plaintiff
was driving on the highway when defendant negligently collided with
plaintiff's automobile overturning it on the opposite side of the road. A
third driver coming from the opposite direction failed to stop on seeing the
overturned automobile with the result that one of the wheels of his car
came through the window of plaintiff's car and caused the death of plain-
tiff's wife. Held: what happened should have been anticipated by defendant
when he negligently overturned the Morrison car, and his negligence was
the proximate cause of the death of plaintiff's wife.
13. State v. Hecht (1933) 165 Md. 415, 169 AtI. 311; Lane v. Atlant.c
Works (1872) 111 Mass. 136; Handyside v. Powers (1887) 145 Mass. 123,
13 N. E. 462; McIntire v. Roberts (1889) 149 Mass. 450, 22 N. E. 13, 4
L. R. A. 519, 14 Am. St. Rep. 432; Koelsch v. Philadelphia Co. (1893) 152
Pa. 355, 25 Atl. 522, 18 L. R. A. 759, 34 Am. St. Rep. 653; 1 Sherman &
Redfield, A Treatise on the Law of Negligence (6th ed. 1913) §§32, 34.
14. Wagner v. International Ry. Co. (1921) 232 N. Y. 176, 133 N. E.
437, 19 A. L. R. 1.
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